THREE:But the attempts to reduce the other chiefs to subjection were unsuccessful. An unfortunate collision with the tribes of Ghilzais formed a painful episode in the Afghan war. The Cabul Pass is a long defile, through which the road runs from Cabul to Jelalabad, which it was therefore necessary to keep open for the purpose of safe intercourse between Cabul and British India. The Indian Government thought that the most desirable mode of effecting this object was to pay the Ghilzai chiefs a yearly sum from the Cabul treasury, in order that our troops might not be molested. But retrenchment being determined upon, the money was withheld; the chiefs, therefore, felt that the British had been guilty of a deliberate breach of faith. They were exasperated, assumed a hostile attitude, and cut off all communication with British India. It therefore became necessary to force the Pass, for which purpose Major-General Sir Robert Sale was sent by General Elphinstone from Cabul, with a brigade, of light infantry. On the 12th of October they entered the Pass, near the middle of which the enemy were found posted behind precipitous ridges of the mountains on each side, from which they opened a well-directed fire. General Sale was hit with a ball above the ankle, and compelled to retire and give the command to Colonel Dennie. The Pass was gallantly cleared, but with severe fighting and heavy loss. After this was accomplished, the force had still to fight its way through a difficult country, occupied by an active enemy, for eighteen days. All the commanding points of the hills were held by the Ghilzais, where they were protected by breastworks; and though they had been from time to time outflanked and routed, when the march was resumed and the cumbrous train of baggage filed over the mountains the enemy again appeared from beyond the most distant ridges, renewing the contest with increased numbers and the most savage fury. Since leaving Cabul our troops had been kept constantly on the alert by attacks night and day. Their positions had been secured only by unremitting labour, throwing up entrenchments, and very severe outpost duty. The enemy were eminently skilful at the species of warfare to which their attempts had been confined, and were armed with weapons that enabled them to annoy the invaders from a distance at which they could be reached only by our artillery. The brigade reached Jelalabad on the 12th of November.Nelson, who had returned to England, by the 15th of September was on board of his old flagship, the Victory, and immediately sailed for Cadiz, accompanied only by three other ships of war. On the 29th he arrived off Cadiz, and was received by the fleet with enthusiastic acclamation. It was his birthday. He posted himself about twenty leagues to the west of Cadiz, in hope that the French fleet would come out. He knew that it was in great distress for provisions, because Napoleon, intending the fleet to assemble at Brest, had laid in the necessary stores there, and could not convey them, in any reasonable time, to Cadiz. Still more, it was believed that Napoleon refused to send any supplies there, having given Villeneuve imperative orders to make his way to Brest. But it is also asserted, by French authorities, that Napoleon had ordered the Minister of Marine to take the command from Villeneuve, and that the admiral was piqued to show the Emperor, by a daring exploit, that he had done him injustice. Under these or similar motives, Villeneuve determined to sail out, and encounter the British fleet. Nelson was watching for him behind Cape St. Mary, like a cat watching a mouse, as he said in a letter to the Abb Campbell, of Naples, a friend of his and of Lady Hamilton's. On the 9th of October, certain that the enemy would soon come out, Nelson sent to Lord Collingwood his plan of the battle. It was to advance in two lines of sixteen ships each, with an advanced squadron of eight of the fastest-sailing two-decked ships. They were thus to break the enemy's line in three places at once. Nelson was to aim at the centre; Collingwood, leading the second line, to break through at about the twelfth ship from the rear; and the light squadron, at three or four ships from the centreNelson's point of attack. "I look," wrote Nelson, "with confidence to a victory before the van of the enemy can succour their rear; and then the British fleet will, most of them, be ready to receive their twenty sail of the line, or to pursue them, should they endeavour to make off. If the van of the enemy tack, the captured ships must run to the leeward of the British fleet; if the enemy wear, the British must place themselves between them and the captured and disabled British ships, and, should the enemy close, I have no fear for the result. The second in command will, in all possible things, direct the movements of his line by keeping them as compact as the nature of the circumstances will admit. Captains are to look to their particular line as their rallying-point; but, in case signals cannot be clearly seen or understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy!" Such were Nelson's general orders, and they were entirely approved by Lord Collingwood.
