ONE:Another expedition, planned by the Grenville Ministry, produced no favourable result. This was to Constantinople. Buonaparte had sent thither the artful Sebastiani, and General Andreossi, to destroy British influence, and to engage the Sultan in war with Russia, so as to act as a most effectual diversion of the Russian forces, whilst he himself was occupied with the Czar in the North. The French agents had completely succeeded in their plans against Russia. The Sultan assumed an attitude which compelled Alexander to keep a strong army on the Lower Danube, thus weakening his force against Napoleon, and distracting his attention. There appeared every probability that British influence would be equally swamped in Turkey by the French, and it was determined to send a naval squadron to Constantinople to overawe the Sultan Selim, and to compel the removal of the French intriguants. Had this expedition been committed to such a man as Sir Sidney Smith, there is little doubt but that it would have been entirely successful; but it was altogether most miserably mismanaged, and therefore failed. To have been effectual it should have been sudden. There should have been no previous negotiation about it; the ships should have appeared off Constantinople, and then and there the ambassador should have stated his terms and have insisted on them. Instead of this, our ambassador, Mr. Arbuthnot, commenced his negotiations for the strengthening of the British alliance in conjunction with Russia, and for the restriction of the French influence. But, excepting Britain, Russia had no advocates with the Porte, which had already declared war. The victories of Buonaparte now in Austria and Prussia gave the French great clat with the Turks, and Sebastiani made the utmost of this advantage. He was zealously supported by Spain and Holland. In the midst of these negotiations, Admiral Louis appeared off Constantinople with one ship of the line and one frigate. Had it[537] been a whole fleet, the effect would have been decisive. As it was, there was immediately a rumour that a great British fleet was on the way, and accordingly the Turks were in a hurry to strengthen their fortifications, and make every arrangement for defence. They were ably assisted in these measures by Sebastiani, Andreossi, and a number of French engineer officers. On the 10th of February Sir John Duckworth appeared off the Dardanelles, and, joining his squadron with that of Admiral Louis, the British fleet now consisted of eight line-of-battle ships, two frigates, and two bombs. But on the 14th the Ajax, one of the men-of-war, took fire, and blew up, killing two hundred and fifty of the people on board. They had then to wait till the 19th for a breeze that would carry them through the strait. The British ships passed the batteries under a brisk fire, without replying, and on the 20th of February Sir John Duckworth came to anchor off Prince's Islands, opposite to Constantinople, and at about ten miles' distance. Now was the time to have struck an effectual terror by demanding the immediate dismissal of the French, and to have begun storming the town unless the demand was at once complied with. The whole population was in an astounding panic, expecting every moment the commencement of the bombardment; and the Sultan sent Ismail Bey to request Sebastiani and his suite to quit Constantinople without delay. But Sebastiani replied that there was no cause of alarm from the British, he was perfectly indifferent to their presence, and that, as he was under the protection of the Porte, he should not quit Constantinople without an express order from the Sultan. Had Sir Sidney Smith been in command, Sebastiani would soon have received this order, for he would have quickened the Sultan's movements by some shot and shells sent into the Seraglio; but Duckworth was made of much more phlegmatic stuff. The wind on the 21st was fair, and the whole fleet expected the order to put across and commence bombarding the city. Instead of that, however, Sir John sent a fresh message and menace. As this received no answer, and yet was followed by no prompt action, the[538] Turks at once took heart, went on fortifying and planting batteries, and continued to amuse Sir John from day to day with hopes of treating, employing the time only to make their defences, under the supervision of Sebastiani and the French engineers, the more perfect. It is almost impossible to imagine a British admiral so besotted as to continue this course for ten days; yet this was precisely what Sir John Duckworth did, and that in spite of the orders of Admiral Collingwood. By this time every possible point of defence had its batteries, soldiers had poured into Constantinople, and every male inhabitant was armed, and foaming with fury at the British. On the morning of the 1st of March Sir John weighed anchor to return from his ignominious, abortive mission. The wind was fair for him, but his return was now not so easy a matter. Whilst he had been wasting his time before Constantinople, Turkish engineers, who had studied under the French, had been sent down to the Dardanelles with two hundred well-trained cannoneers. Numbers of troops had been collected on each side of the strait, and the batteries were supplied with enormous cannons, capable of carrying granite balls of seven or eight hundred pounds' weight. Towards nightfall he dropped down towards the strait, and the next day cast anchor before passing the castles and batteries, that he might sail through by daylight, when the enemy could best see him. On the morning of the 3rd he accordingly sailed through the strait, and was sharply assailed by the cannon of the forts and batteries, the stone shot doing some of his ships damage, and the loss of men being twenty-nine killed and a hundred and forty wounded. The object of the expedition failed, and the only resource was to keep the Turkish fleet blockaded.
TWO:Meanwhile the French generals, though they saw insurrections rising in every quarter, and though they themselves were located in different parts of the country, distant from each other, entertained no fear but that the steady discipline of their troops, and their own experience, would easily put them down. Murat had quitted Spain to proceed to his kingdom of Naples, which he had received on the 15th of July, and Savary was left at Madrid as Commander-in-Chief, and he found himself in a most arduous and embarrassing post, with so many points to watch and to strengthen for the suppression of the insurrection. The Spanish junta recommended their country, very prudently, to avoid regular engagements, with their yet raw forces, against the veteran armies of France, but to carry on a guerilla warfare, waylaying the enemy in mountains and defiles, cutting off their supplies, and harassing their rear, their outposts, and their foraging parties. The ardour and pride of the Spaniards only too much tempted the men to despise this advice, and whenever they did they severely paid for it. The relentless spirit of the people against the lawless invaders, on the other hand, incited the French to equal ferocity. They treated the Spaniards as rebels in arms against their king; the villages were given up to the plunder and licentiousness of the soldiers. This again fired the Spaniards to retaliation, and they put to death sick and wounded when they fell into their hands. The war thus commenced with features of peculiar horror. The character of the country rendered the conflict the more desperate to the invaders; the fertile regions were separated from each other[555] by vast desert heaths and barren mountains, so that Henry IV. had said truly, if a general invaded Spain with a small army he would be defeated; if with a large one, he would be starved. To collect provisions, the French had to disperse themselves over wide tracts, and thus exposed themselves to the ambuscades and surprises of the Spaniards, every peasant carrying his gun.
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