THREE:This is not making the percipi of objects their esse. Again, in the eighth chapter he tells us that the soul is ��in a certain way�� (π??) all things, since all things are either sensible or cogitable; and then he proceeds to explain what is meant by372 ��in a certain way.�� Sense and knowledge are distributed over things in such wise that their possibility is the possibility, and their actuality the actuality, of the things. They must, then, be either the things themselves or their forms. ��But the things themselves they are surely not, for the stone is not in the soul, but its form.�� In the Metaphysics, Aristotle expresses himself to the same effect, but even more explicitly. Criticising the Protagorean doctrine, he reduces it to an absurdity by urging that if there were nothing but sensibles, then nothing at all could exist in the absence of animated beings, for without them there would be no sensation. He admits that in the case supposed there would be neither feelings nor felt objects, since these presuppose a sentient subject; but adds, that for the substances (τ? ?ποκε?μενα) which produce the feeling not to exist is impossible; ��for there is something else besides the feeling which must necessarily exist before it.��268 And immediately afterwards he clinches the argument by observing that if appearances were the only truth, there would be no independent existences, and everything would be relative, since appearances exist only in relation to some one to whom they appear. Now we need hardly say that this universal relativity was precisely what Ferrier contended for.