ONE:"The Netherlands has done already so much, but if it would come to the assistance of our215 unfortunate people also in this way it would greatly gladden the archiepiscopal government, who will be only too happy to accept gifts in these difficult times; and perhaps the Right Reverend Netherland bishops may be willing to send the gifts for this purpose to us. We might then distribute those gifts among the parishes in the country which have suffered most."CHAPTER XXV. A CHECK.
THREE:268
THREE:This is not making the percipi of objects their esse. Again, in the eighth chapter he tells us that the soul is in a certain way (π??) all things, since all things are either sensible or cogitable; and then he proceeds to explain what is meant by372 in a certain way. Sense and knowledge are distributed over things in such wise that their possibility is the possibility, and their actuality the actuality, of the things. They must, then, be either the things themselves or their forms. But the things themselves they are surely not, for the stone is not in the soul, but its form. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle expresses himself to the same effect, but even more explicitly. Criticising the Protagorean doctrine, he reduces it to an absurdity by urging that if there were nothing but sensibles, then nothing at all could exist in the absence of animated beings, for without them there would be no sensation. He admits that in the case supposed there would be neither feelings nor felt objects, since these presuppose a sentient subject; but adds, that for the substances (τ? ?ποκε?μενα) which produce the feeling not to exist is impossible; for there is something else besides the feeling which must necessarily exist before it.268 And immediately afterwards he clinches the argument by observing that if appearances were the only truth, there would be no independent existences, and everything would be relative, since appearances exist only in relation to some one to whom they appear. Now we need hardly say that this universal relativity was precisely what Ferrier contended for.
THREE:Nothing can be more unreasonable than to expect an apprentice engineer to begin by an inductive course in learning and reasoning [3] about mechanics. Even if the mind were capable of such a course, which can not be assumed in so intricate and extensive a subject as mechanics, there would be a want of interest and an absence of apparent purpose which would hinder or prevent progress. Any rational view of the matter, together with as many facts as can be cited, will all point to the conclusion that apprentices must learn deductively, and that some practice should accompany or precede theoretical studies. How dull and objectless it seems to a young man when he toils through "the sum of the squares of the base and perpendicular of a right-angle triangle," without knowing a purpose to which this problem is to be applied; he generally wonders why such puzzling theorems were ever invented, and what they can have to do with the practical affairs of life. But if the same learner were to happen upon a builder squaring a foundation by means of the rule "six, eight, and ten," and should in this operation detect the application of that tiresome problem of "the sum of the squares," he would at once awake to a new interest in the matter; what was before tedious and without object, would now appear useful and interesting. The subject would become fascinating, and the learner would go on with a new zeal to trace out the connection between practice and other problems of the kind. Nothing inspires a learner so much as contact with practice; the natural tendency, as before said, is to proceed deductively.
